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MOTIVATION – I, slide 1 of 3  
THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS - USNRC (draft) RG after 2014 
 
Characterizing LOCA breakaway oxidation – RG 1.222 (17) 
 H2 that enters the clad promotes rapid embrittlement  (alloy composition 
 dependent). 
 
Determining Post Quench Ductility (PQD) – RG 1.223 (18) 
 High PCT (1200 °C) and high local clad oxidation (17%) may not ensure PQD. High 
 Bu makes the situation worse. 
 
Establishing (new) limits for Zr-Alloy clad material – RG 1.224 (19) 
 An alloy-specific cladding H2 uptake model is required. Accounting for 
 oxygen ingress on the ID is needed for Bu > 30.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zircaloy-2 
H2 ppm vs Bu 
Eq. Clad React. Vs H2 ppm  
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THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS  
Literature overview – Support information in Appendix 1 
 
[FAILURES WITH PARAMETER RANGES WITHIN DBA BOUNDARIES] 
 
• BALLOONING:  burst, pressure, temperature and time (recently measured) 
showing clad temperature values (at burst)  as low as 500 °C – 600 °C. 
     
• OXIDE: oxide and oxide thickness (a function of Bu) ‘enlarge fuel failure 
region’, inducing spalling, hydride formation and embrittlement 
  
• HOOP STRESS: individual nuclear fuel rod stress calculation now possible 
during the in-core fuel cycles: wide range results are predicted  
 
• PCMI & PCI/SCC: complex failure mechanisms better understood, brittle 
rupture (frequently) possible.  
 
• SNF: Clad weakness also affects releases from SNF and consequent 
radiological impact upon the environment (a function of Bu and LHGR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOTIVATION – I, slide 2 of 3  
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FURTHERMORE – Literature overview 
 
 
ATR (Accident Tolerant Fuel), i.e. new material intended to prolong 
cladding life, the coated cladding supporting extended exposure to high 
temperature (1300 – 1400 °C) during LOCA, RIA and BDBA, the SiC (Silicon 
Carbide) cladding characterized by high melting point and minimal reaction 
with water (expected for commercial use in 2022), will not change the 
provided picture and the inevitable weakness of B1 (see 
below). 
 
 
Fuel integrity following mechanical loads generated by the 
pressure wave dependent upon the Break Opening Time 
(BOT) in case of LBLOCA is not ensured: no experimental 
evidence available, current computational capability questionable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOTIVATION – I, slide 3 of 3  
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THE NUCLEAR DISASTERS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TMI-2 - 1979 CHERNOBYL-4 - 1986 
FUKUSHIMA-1-4 - 2011 
(2) WE MUST WORK TO 
MINIMIZE THE 
POSSIBILITY OF 
OCCURRENCE OF 
THOSE EVENTS AND 
THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
MOTIVATION – II, slide 1 of 1  
   
THE ELEMENTS FOR THE PROPOSAL (20 & 21) 
 
ALARA (As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable) is an early 
principle, adopted for Radioprotection & disconnected from DSA. 
 
IA (Independent Assessment) is a requirement, pursued only in 
principle: a wish rather than an achievement .  
 
BEPU (Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty) is a key approach 
[origin of the term: nuclear thermal-hydraulics and AA during the ‘90s], not 
commonly accepted. 
 
E-SM (Extended Safety Margin) is derived from SM, i.e. an 
established concept in nuclear reactor safety 
 
ERT (Emergency  Rescue Team) is a virtual entity: it shall be 
mandatory after Fukushima.      
BACKGROUND 
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THE VISION FOR NRS 
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Role for  
BEPU 
Region 
for IA 
SM / E-SM 
Making 
‘concrete’ 
the role of 
ALARA 
BACKGROUND 
BACKGROUND 
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THE VISION FOR SAFETY BARRIERS 
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NOT A PHYSICAL 
BOUNDARY 
Current NPP 
OBJECTIVE  
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TO PROPOSE  
 
THE BASES  
FOR CONSTITUTING AN 
 ADDITIONAL SAFETY BARRIER  
 
AGAINST THE RELEASE OF FISSION 
PRODUCTS 
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NRC – Interim Acceptance Criteria 
NRC – Appendix K to 10 CFR 50.46 
NRC – RG 1.157 
NRC – RG 1.203 
Angra-2 BE LB-LOCA 
Atucha-2 BEPU Chapter 15 
1970 
2010 
 
A HISTORIC OUTLINE 
THE BEPU FEATURES 
2020 BEPU-FSAR 
1
9
9
0
 
SAFETY ANALYSIS / LICENSING – IAEA SSG-2, 2010 
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BEPU  
THE BEPU FEATURES – Accident Analysis 
THE BEPU FEATURES – BEPU & ALARA 
WHAT IS BEPU? 
 The BEPU is a logical process which connects the understanding in NRS (and licensing) 
with nuclear TH. 
 
 The starting point for BEPU are the physical phenomena. This implies the DBA envelope. 
  
 BEPU implies the existence of qualified computational tools dealing with different 
disciplines, input decks or nodalizations and a method to evaluate the uncertainty. 
 
 BEPU needs the existence of qualified procedures for the application of the 
computational tools. 
 
 BEPU needs the existence of qualified code users and of maven capable of evaluating 
the acceptability of analysis. 
 
 BEPU needs the existence of ’legal’ acceptance criteria. 
 
 The application of BEPU implies the knowledge of the licensing process. 
 
 The structure of the FSAR must be adapted to BEPU including the design of the core, 
the experimental data drawn during the commissioning, the design of EOP, etc. 
 
 Any BEPU report should be a living document. 13/35 
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 Computational tools / SYS TH codes – design and development 
 Computational tools / SYS TH codes – V & V procedures 
 Computational tools / SYS TH codes – procedures for application 
 Computational tools / nodalizations (or input decks) – development 
 Computational tools /nodalizations – V & V  procedures 
 Computational tools / code-coupling software – design and development 
 Uncertainty methods / design and development 
 Uncertainty methods / qualification procedures 
 NPP parameters database 
 Postulated Initiating Events (PIE)   
 Phenomena / physical aspects which characterize PIE 
 Databases for code and nodalization qualification 
 Scaling demonstration / procedures and database 
 Users of computational tools / qualification 
 DSA – PSA integration 
 Instrumentation and Control (I & C) modeling 
 Documentation requirements for each elements 
 Licensing framework – acceptance criteria, safety margins, procedures, etc.   
V & V;  UNC;  
 
COUPLING; DB; 
 
SCALING 
  
WHAT IS BEPU?-  CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS 
THE BEPU FEATURES 
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Code Verification Activities
Functional 
Requirements of 
the Code
Code Verification Plan
• Objectives
• Approach
• Schedule
• Plan for testing
Numerical solution
• Verification matrix
• Comparison with 
- Manufactured solutions
- Analytical solution
- Highly accurate 
numerical solution 
- Experiment
Source code 
(Software quality 
engineering )
• Configuration 
management
• Software quality 
analysis and testing
Numerical algorithm
• Verification matrix
• Tests for   
- Conservation
- Flow transitions
- Convergence
• Robustness
• Versatility 
VALIDATION:  STARTING FROM 
SETF & ITF CCVM + FFTBM FOR ACCURACY QUANTIFICATION 
RECENT CONCEPTS: 
 
 ASSESSMENT OF VALIDATION 
 (MINIMUM) INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT FOR CODE USER 
V & V 
KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU  
DRAFT  
IAEA-SRS-xxxx 
 
 
 
Verification and Validation 
of Thermal-Hydraulic System 
Codes for  
Nuclear Safety Analyses 
 
 
DRAFT-IAEA 
V&V – 2017  
VERIFICATION  
ESTABLISHED QA PRACTICE 
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KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU  
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HIERARCHY & KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT   
SCALING 
‘BRIDGES’ & ACHIEVEMENTS 
OECD/NEA/CSNI  
S-SOAR – 2017  
UNCERTAINTY 
KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU  
Multiple Input
n ~ 105
BIC         CODE                INPUT
DECK
1
2
n
Selection of input
uncertain parameters
n* < 102
ID of range & PDF
per each n* 
Multiple Output
m ~ 103
(typical, uninfluent)
1
2
m
Predicted
NPP transient
scenario 
UNCERTAINTY
PROPAGATION
1 - PROPAGATION OF CODE INPUT “UNCERTAINTIES”
Multiple Input
n ~ 105
BIC         CODE                INPUT
DECK
1
2
n
Multiple Output
m ~ 103
(typical, uninfluent)
1
2
m
Predicted
NPP transient
scenario 
UNCERTAINTY
PROPAGATION
Relevant 
experimental
data 
Accuracy quantification
& criteria for accuracy
extrapolation 
2 - PROPAGATION OF CALCULATION OUTPUT “ERRORS”
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IAEA 
SRS-52 – 2008  
The crack shape is assumed elliptical (two-dimensional crack) and 
the dimensions are taken from the ASME XI: 
½ (102)¼ (102)< 1023
½ (305)¼ (305)> 3052
½ Wall thickness¼ Wall thickness102 – 3051
Crack length 
(mm)
Crack depth 
(mm)
Wall thickness 
(mm)
No.
 
Crack position
RPV wall thickness = 290 mm
a = Crack Depth ~ 7 mm
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CODE COUPLING 
KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU  
EC-NEA 
CRISSUE-S – 2004  
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THE PROCESS
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS  /  FSAR – CHAPT. 15
We are 
here!
LICENSING BEPU  Other Disciplines + PSA
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(TH) DATABASE / APPLICATION 
KEY ELEMENTS OF BEPU  
NA-SA / UNIPI 
ARN (R GULATORY BODY) - APPROVED 2012 
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ENHANCING THE SM CONCEPT 
E-SM CONTRIBUTED BY  BEPU-FSAR  
A1) Safety Principles, i.e. SP-1 to SP-10; 
A2) DID Levels, i.e. DL-1 to DL-5; 
A3) Safety Barriers, i.e. SB-1 to SB-6; 
A4) Safety Functions, i.e.SF-1 to SF-19; 
A5) PSA Elements, i.e. PE-1 to PE-n; 
A6) DSA Elements, i.e. DE-1 to DE-m.   
NRST : THE KEY ELEMENTS
THE ‘A’ LIST – 6 topics –
KEY 
ELEMENTS
NRST – THE 
VIRTUAL 
SPACE
KEY 
ELEMENTS
TECHNOLO
GICAL
SECTORS
SSC
SYSTEMS-
STRUCTURES-
COMPONENTS
THE 
LIFETIME
…
…
SM
A
B
C
D
A ‘FEW’ 10E4 E-SM 
DEFINITIONS 
 
E-SM 
21/35 
ENHANCING THE SM CONCEPT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA / SAFETY LIMITS VALUES 
SAFETY BARRIER 1 TO 6 SAFETY FUNCTION 1 TO 19 
Safety Margin No 
Close to the limit 
Acceptable 
Safe 
2 
1 
….  n 
… Average SM 
…. SF 1 to 19 
Average SM 
SB 1 to 6 
E-SM CONTRIBUTED BY  BEPU-FSAR  
AROUND 10E4 E-SM  
 
DETECTION & CONTROL 
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ISSUES WITH CURRENT IA 
ISSUES 
 
NPP COMPLEXITY 
(efforts needed for IA ‘too large’ out of industry) 
 
 
SAFETY DEPENDING UPON DETAILS  
(details un-known out of industry; issue is proprietary information) 
 
 
INDUSTRY ENGAGED IN CONTINUOUS CHANGES / IMPROVEMENTS 
(changes not necessarily qualified, e.g. passive systems) 
 
 
IA ONLY POSSIBLE WITH LATEST BE TECHNIQUES  
(expertise may not be available out of industry) 
 
 
EXPERT ANALYSTS NOT NECESSARILY AWARE OF LICENSING DETAILS 
(the licensing framework is complex, too) 
 
2
ERT 
EMERGENCY RESCUE TEAM (20) 
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1. ERT ELEMENTS 
 
• Helicopter  
• DG + pump 
• Team (of around 5) 
2. ERT OPERATION 
RANGE 
 
About 500 km in a Country 
or geographical region 
targeting (typically) 10 NPP 
3. ERT WORKING MODE 
 
Plug-in pump delivery side to known  (3-5)  NPP  ERT-connectors 
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Integrating ALARA, BEPU, E-SM, IA, ERT  
ALARA  
NRS REQUIREMENTS 
BEPU 
[BEPU-FSAR] 
SM 
[E-SM] 
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T
 
LEGEND 
 
Philosophy    
 
Software 
 
Hardware 
 
Writing   
 
NPP UNIT 
ERT 
ADDITIONAL SAFETY BARRIER 
   
 
One may state that: 
 
 
a principle (ALARA taken from fundamentals of the technology) + 
 
a requirement  (IA, becoming actual) + 
 
an approach (BEPU, becoming practical) +  
 
a concept  (E-SM established in nuclear reactor safety, now expanded)  + 
 
a virtual entity (ERT, becoming physical)  =  
ADDITIONAL SAFETY BARRIER 
a ‘new’  SAFETY BARRIER 
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• NOT-RECOGNIZING  the weakness of the barrier 
constituted by clad, 
 
• DELETING LBLOCA from the list of DBA (equals 
admitting no control of the technology),  
 
 
HAVE A CONSEQUENCE: 
 
LOW (TECHNICIANS AND) PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE! 
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FINAL REMARKS  -  slide 1 of 3 
- FURTHER EVALUATION OF CURRENT STATUS -  
1) ALARA at the origin of BEPU. 
2) BEPU based on V&V, Scaling, Code Coupling, 
Uncertainty, and Database. BEPU extended to the 
entire FSAR (analytical parts). 
3) E-SM (comprehensive and systematic set of) 
derivable with support from BEPU. 
4) IA based on BEPU and making possible BEPU  
5) ERT  a (very) simple product of current technology 
SUMMARY 
BEPU: must be pursued. Any further delay  is not justifiable for 
NRS. Safety Assessment (Licensing) must be independent of 
Vendor-Owner  BEPU-based I-FSAR & E-SM.  
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FINAL REMARKS  - slide 2 of 3 
- FIVE ELEMENTS FOR THE NEW SAFETY BARRIER -  
Reporting (again) the words of Australian-Chinese colleagues who 
analyzed the framework of the Fukushima event:  “… upgrading and 
strengthening a nuclear regulatory system is not optional but 
imperative to prevent the next core meltdown.” 
 
1) … STRENGTHENING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
2) RISK OF CORE MELT LOWERED  (to be demonstrated ) 
FOR A FACTOR 10 - 1000. 
 
3) PROBABILITY OF CORE MELT  (target) TO THE LEVEL 
OF METEORITE FALL ON THE NPP. 
 
4) COST OF NEW BARRIER  ≈ 1% CURRENT NPP. 
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FINAL REMARKS  -  slide 3 of 3 
- THE NEW NPP  -  
THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – Literature overview 
 
BALLOONING:  pressure and temperature during experiments  w/o (15), (11) 
and w relocation (14) considered; azimuthal temperature asymmetry (6)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Burst pressure, temperature, time 
APPENDIX  1 – (SUPPORT TO) MOTIVATION  1 OF 5 
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APPENDIX  1 – (SUPPORT TO) MOTIVATION 2 OF 5 
THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – Literature overview 
 
OXIDE THICKNESS (11) vs Bu and failures (3). Hydride rim depth vs oxide 
thickness and burst failures (7) and sketch of spalling and hydriding (8)-(9) 
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THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – Literature overview 
 
• HOOP STRESS: detailed NPP (Watts, US) calculations  are possible showing 
widely changing conditions, including Bu effect (10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX  1 – (SUPPORT TO) MOTIVATION 3 OF 5 
Cycle 1 axial maximum  hoop stress (MPa) 
Cycle 3 axial maximum  hoop stress (MPa) 
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THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – Literature overview 
 
PCMI failures – RIA (7) and PCI/SCC failures, IR project for BWR, (5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX  1 – (SUPPORT TO) MOTIVATION 4 OF 5 
The model assumes that SCC failures begin as an 
inter-granular fracture due to cesium–iodine chemical 
attack (in presence of oxygen potential) and 
independent of applied stress, … that leads to cracks 
propagation. Clads fail with small diameter changes at 
relatively low values of LHGR (final ramp). 
Early (2010) RIA code results 
showing Bu effect upon clad 
failures (see also effect of oxide 
thickness-  this appendix, slide 
2 of 5). 
THE NUCLEAR FUEL WEAKNESS – Literature overview 
 
SNF: Instant Release Fraction at high Bu (40 -60) sharply increases when 
LHGR > 20 kw/m  (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX  1 – (SUPPORT TO) MOTIVATION 5 OF 5 
Part 1 - When the SNF is disposed of in an underground repository, the radionuclides 
may gradually be released after failure of the canister and subsequent water ingress. 
The release rate of radionuclides differs depending on their chemical properties, their 
chemical speciation in the fuel, as well as the location where they are segregated 
within the SNF. 
Part 2 - The release of soluble 
segregated elements from the 
accessible gap, cracks and grain 
boundaries is fast. Most of their 
inventory is released within a few 
months or even days. The quantity 
of these rapidly released inventories 
normalized to the total nuclide 
inventories is commonly called the 
Instant Release Fraction (IRF) … 
they can significantly contribute to or 
even dominate the calculated dose 
exposure. 
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